
1.0 DEPARTMENT OVERVIEW

Since October 2001, MGT of America, Inc., has been conducting a management and performance audit of the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department (MNPd). To this point, 11 MGT staff members have been on-site during 14 individual weeks. To date this review has entailed:

- Project initiation activity with Metro Audit Staff
- Evaluation of workload and performance data
- Interviews of key individuals in Metro Government
- Interviews of key individuals in MNPd
- Interviews of various community groups and leaders
- Interviews of officials in other government units
- 21 focus groups of employees at all organizational levels
- Follow-up interviews with MNPd and Metro staff
- Tours of all major facilities operated by MNPd
- Review of major processes and operations
- Review of General Orders
- Review of Accreditation Standards in key areas
- Ride-alongs with Patrol Officers and ID field personnel
- Peer Analysis Review involving six selected peer agencies
- Review of various reports, files, and documents surrounding operating performance and personnel.

1.1 Overview of Departmental Budget

The 2001–2002 budget totaled \$109,691,263, approximately \$97 million of which is for personnel related expenditures. At the time of the audit, there were 1,226 sworn and 626 non-sworn personnel on the police department staff. A total of 191 of the non-

sworn positions are part-time school crossing guards, and these positions have been excluded from the peer analysis. It should also be noted that the peer analysis was done based on data collected in January 2002. Since that time MNPd has enrolled an academy class of new police recruits, which will add 41 additional patrol officers. This presumes no transfers out of Patrol will occur when these officers are released for full duty at the end of their training. However, it is common for such transfers to occur to fill vacancies in other areas. At the time of this report these officers were assigned to the Field Training Program, completing training requirements prior to assignment as solo police officers in the Patrol Division.

As part of the peer analysis review mentioned above, we evaluated budget levels. The peer budget amount becomes very significant when reviewing resource allocation and deployment issues. If a department does not have sufficient resources, then appropriate allocation is impossible. For this reason, a baseline issue is to determine if it appears that sufficient funding exists to carry out expected operations. From our assessment of funding, it appears that sufficient budgetary amounts exist.

Shown as Exhibit 1-1 is a comparison of current fiscal year funding of Nashville and the selected peers. This comparison shows that MNPd is comparable to the levels of other peer agencies.

Also provided, as Exhibit 1-2, is a look at per capita budget amount for Nashville and the peers. This chart shows that MNPd's expenditure per citizen is about \$201. From looking at these two exhibits, it appears that MNPd is funded at levels that are within the expected range of funding for an organization of its size and complexity. Taken as a whole, these analyses show that although MNPd is at the low end of the range, Nashville is allocating a reasonable level of total resources to the police function.

EXHIBIT 1-1 2002 BUDGET





EXHIBIT 1-2 DEPARTMENT BUDGET PER CAPITA



Additionally, approximately 88 percent of MNPD's budget is related to personnel. The 2001–2002 budget increased by 10.4 percent, in part to provide funding for a pay plan increase to ensure that police salaries were at market levels.

In Chapter 3.0 there will be a more detailed discussion of how budget dollars are spent, staffing levels, local crime rate, and other peer comparisons.

1.2 Use of Community Policing Focus to Frame Recommendations

In developing our recommendations we have attempted to measure the intent of each recommendation against the Community Policing philosophy and the reality of limited resources. We have attempted to focus on ways to directly impact crime and citizen safety, using existing resources to the fullest extent and in the most efficient and effective manner possible before recommending additional officers, equipment, or funds.

Most organizations can use additional resources. However, before additional resources are allocated the best possible use must be made of existing resources. In the case of MNPD, we have found an organization with a high degree of specialization of units, a very centralized approach to most activities, and the lowest percentage of sworn officers assigned to the Patrol function of any of the peer agencies that we reviewed. (See Chapter 3.0 for detailed comparisons of Patrol Officers with Peer Agencies.) This combination creates extreme pressure on Patrol Officers to address calls for service needs and meet administrative requirements while attempting to undertake proactive Community Policing activities.

Community Policing has been defined in many ways. Most common definitions include some reference to returning the major emphasis of the policing function back to basic police officer-to-citizen interactions, returning officers to the streets, focusing on crime prevention, and responding rapidly to any emerging crime trends. Without

question, Community Policing is popular with citizens. Community Policing is also popular with officers if they have the time to practice it.

MNPD is poised to undertake a meaningful effort at Community Policing due to the existence of the five Sector Stations, and another station about to be built in North Nashville. However, as currently used, these Sector Stations are little more than staging areas for Patrol Officers. The Sector Stations lack sufficient resources to mobilize for addressing specific crime issues. The “Flex Units” provide some capacity to be used in a targeted manner, but they cannot address all needs in the Sectors. Only by providing additional resources directly to the Sectors—which Sector Commanders can utilize as needed to address specific problems—can a real Community Policing philosophy be implemented.

The major premise for the recommendations throughout this report is that a greater amount of enforcement resources should be assigned to the Sectors and be under the direct command of the Sector Commanders. Several recommendations depart significantly from the status quo. Existing Divisions would be collapsed, new organizational units would be created, a number of Detectives would be assigned directly to the Sectors, and many reporting relationships would be revised. We made these recommendations after a great deal of consideration. We believe each of these actions will aid the department in focusing energy on improving crime fighting and/or crime prevention capacity. These moves will help the department to better identify how officers can best be utilized.

One of the most far-reaching recommendations made below is the creation of the new Strategic Deployment Division. This division, which will combine the bulk of the existing Planning and Research Division and the existing Fiscal Affairs Unit, will also be tasked with coordinating the department’s overall strategic planning efforts. It will also

be the area of the department responsible for implementing adopted audit recommendations, as well as future process review and process re-engineering efforts. By formally combining these functions into one Division, the department will have the capacity and structure to fully integrate planning, budgeting, and all other aspects of resource allocation.

Many of the following recommendations call for further review. In some cases more review is needed because the function in question is too complex to attempt to fully explore during the course of this audit. In other cases, the need for further review is based on the lack of performance measures and/or specific data to allow the assessment of capacity or performance at this time. In order to ensure that unit performance is at a satisfactory level, such ongoing reviews are essential.

1.3 Background and Department Overall

In each of the sections of this report, specific information will be presented about individual functional areas. Information that pertains to the department as a whole is presented in this summary .

COMMENDATIONS:

- The department successfully obtained national accreditation as recognized by the Commission for the Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA). The department was initially accredited and successfully reaccredited once. MNPd will receive reaccreditation status for a second time in July 2002.
- In spite of a high level of frustration, driven largely by staffing and resource allocation issues, officers and civilian employees alike are generally positive about the future and want to see the agency improved.
- We have been impressed with the high quality of many staff members, and believe that long-term leadership needs can be met.
- The department is implementing a second generation Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS) before most departments have even attained this technology.

FINDING 1-1

General Order 98-1, Department Goals and Objectives, which references CALEA Accreditation Standards, requires the annual creation of goals and objectives for the department and each organizational component. This general order, while currently in effect, is not followed effectively. There is no clearly understood or communicated “vision” stating where the department is attempting to go. This lack of shared vision results in Divisions pursuing their own agendas and increases the chance of duplication of efforts. (Note: “General Orders” are the formal written policy and procedure statements that guide the department. These General Orders are published and distributed to all personnel. A General Order will, or should, exist for any topic of significance.)

While formal goals and objectives are developed for the department as part of the Accreditation process, as required on an annual basis, no formal Strategic Planning is conducted on a departmentwide basis. This lack of a current Strategic Plan and the accompanying lack of specifically defined operational strategies and adopted enforcement priorities result in Bureaus and Divisions adopting their own criteria for utilization of resources.

Formal performance measures are not being used routinely. Minimal management data are captured, with varying quality of such information from unit to unit.

Workload data for the various units are not gathered uniformly. Some units (e.g., Behavioral Health Services) have excellent data on all services provided. Other units such as of the “specialized units” cannot provide precise workload data on their activities. Although not all workload can be translated easily into items you can count and measure, most workload can. We expected to see more precise indicators of performance, such as numbers of planned activities for specific community-oriented policing problems and tabulations of specific results of these activities (these type of data are nonexistent), and to find historical data readily available. In most units, such information is not routinely reported.

Goals and objectives statements have been prepared as part of the accreditation review the department is currently undergoing. While a number of these reports are now available, they were not commonly available earlier in the audit process, nor were working members of the various units aware of their existence. This General Order, while being followed technically and in a manner that satisfies the CALEA accreditation process, is not resulting in rank and file employees being aware of unit or departmental goals.

We also found the goals and objectives that were prepared to be very general in nature and to lack definition of outcomes that would allow the development of specific measures to track accomplishments toward the goals or objectives.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1.1

MNPD should undertake a formal Strategic Planning Process. This process should provide the structure for creating and adopting agencywide and individual unit performance standards and measures as well as current goals and objectives. This

process should not be a top down process, but should involve personnel at all organizational levels.

Goals should be clearly stated in measurable terms. "Making more traffic arrests" is not a clear goal. "Increasing traffic arrests by 10 percent through additional emphasis at high risk intersections" becomes measurable. "Reducing traffic crashes by 15 percent by public education and high visibility enforcement efforts" is also measurable. "Reduce traffic crashes" is not.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Task the Strategic Deployment Division (see recommendation 1.1.2) with creation of a Strategic Planning process.
2. Involve each operating area of the department in the planning process.
3. Establish clear goals and objectives for each unit.
4. Fully integrate the Strategic Planning process with the budget process.
5. Communicate the final plan to employees at all levels.

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact of this process could vary. If only internal resources were utilized to prepare the strategic plan, the costs would be minimal. However, we do not recommend such a plan be created without outside support. We recommend the utilization of highly qualified outside consulting assistance for this effort, for audit implementation assistance, and for additional strategic initiatives described below. It is recommended \$500,000 be budgeted for these efforts.

RECOMMENDATION 1.1.2

Beyond the mere undertaking of a Strategic Planning process, the strategic allocation of all resources and the prioritization of efforts should become a daily concern of the agency. Toward this end, we recommend the creation of an Office of Strategic Deployment. This division level function should be commanded by a Captain. The Office of Strategic Deployment would be tasked with the following duties:

- Strategic Planning Coordination (full departmental oversight and support)
- Current Planning and Research activities (absorbs Planning and Research Division)
- Accreditation
- Grants

- Fiscal Resource Allocation (absorbs Fiscal Affairs Division)
- Core Process Analysis and Re-engineering (internal consulting, audit implementation, coordination of any external implementation consulting that may be obtained)

In order to implement the recommendations made in this report successfully MNPD needs to assign oversight of the implementation process to a specific area. The Office of Strategic Deployment is the logical place for this responsibility. This office would be charged with providing “internal consulting” support for the various task forces, committees, and work groups that will be collectively charged with developing the detailed plans for carrying out the implementation of the numerous recommendations. One of the first orders of business would be to develop reasonable time lines for all audit implementation steps. External consulting support should be used for much of the process review and re-engineering work.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Adopt new organizational structure.
2. Reassign necessary personnel to Strategic Deployment.
3. Develop initial training and team.
4. Create Strategic Planning process model.
5. Undertake department coordination of Strategic Planning and initiate process improvement efforts and implementation of audit recommendations.

FISCAL IMPACT

The fiscal impact for this is included in the previous recommendation.

FINDING 1-2

Many general orders are very dated, not having been revised in several years. Organizational units that no longer exist are referenced, and current units are not addressed. Many of the general orders are still issued over the signature of the previous chief. This lack of timeliness indicates that no thorough review of these orders has occurred for several years. Although we found the “high risk” areas to be addressed in the recent past, many routine areas of the general orders need to be brought up to date.

Failing to maintain current general orders can contribute to a lack of concern over knowing and understanding what the orders contain. If police officers perceive that the department does not prioritize keeping them up to date, then they may not follow the orders.

RECOMMENDATION 1-2

The entire General Order Manual should be reviewed and revised as necessary to bring it into line with actual department organizational structure and operational practices. This process should also be undertaken with an employee work group made up of a cross section of employees.

As the General Order Manual is one of the key ways the department's philosophy is shared with officers and employees, it is imperative that the general orders are revised to reflect a Community Policing orientation and align them with strategic goals.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Create an employee work group to work on General Order review and revision.
2. Provide training to them on their role.
3. Allow the employee work group, with support from Strategic Deployment, to identify General Orders in need of revision, obtain information and assistance needed to make recommended modifications (from internal staff and outside resources), and prepare preliminary drafts.
4. Provide preliminary drafts to Chief and Command Staff for review and input.
5. Finalize General Orders, after additional work, if needed.

FISCAL IMPACT

None. This will be an internal process.

FINDING 1-3

A lack of adequate space for current operational needs and an absence of space for needed expansion are issues that impact many areas of the department.

Throughout the department officers and staff are working in cramped quarters that prevent the provision of minimal dedicated personal space. In many areas of the department there are very critical space and/or facilities design issues. Among the areas in the department that have critical needs are:

- Office of Professional Accountability – shortage of space and needs to be relocated outside the main police facility.
- Domestic Violence – shortage of space and needs to be relocated from current location, which is the former bus maintenance facility.
- Criminal Investigation Division – Detectives sharing space, not enough room for file space, individual desks, or needed interview rooms.

- Identification Division – headquarters identification function is overcrowded, and remote lab facility also has critical space issue.
- Evidence Division – facing problems with space for property and evidence.
- Sector Stations – recommendations in this report call for the reassignment of numerous officers to the Sector Stations. It needs to be determined if each of the Stations has current and future capacity to effectively house such additional personnel.

Individual discussion of these issues is found throughout the audit report. The common theme is that the department as a whole is suffering critical space shortages. The uncommitted space that was available when the current building was constructed has long ago been built out. The ability of the various units to serve the public is in some cases being compromised due to overcrowding.

RECOMMENDATION 1-3

A space utilization and future needs study should be conducted. This study should be comprehensive in nature and review both current allocation of space (and its utilization) and the need for space in the future. Facility design, including how well facilities provide for their intended function, should be a part of this plan.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. An overall space needs study for MNPd should be planned.
2. The space study should involve every area of the department to ensure current needs are understood.
3. The space study should be considered as part of the departmental strategic planning process. The long-term needs of the department will play a big part on accurate identification of long-range space needs.
4. The space study should present specific recommendations about both overall space needs and ways to best utilize existing space until short-term and long-term space needs are met.
5. The final space study report should project long-range needs at five years and ten years.

FISCAL IMPACT

A comprehensive space needs study can be expected to cost approximately \$150,000. This figure could be higher or lower depending on the internal support provided, and depending on the level of detail desired. This study should include an assessment of current needs, effectiveness of current utilization, and future needs.

FINDING 1-4

The lack of a Strategic Plan for Technology has hindered the effective integration of technology throughout the department. In the absence of a departmental approach, individual divisions have pursued their own interests and needs. This division-based approach has not maximized the available resources in this area. During this audit many technology needs were identified. Among these are:

- Computers have not been replaced at a fast enough pace, and many machines are out of date.
- Existing computers, in many cases, cannot run the software/programs needed.
- Not enough computers, or computers of proper capacity, exist for detectives to use effectively (three or more officers/employees share a single computer).
- Laptop computers in use by Patrol have very limited capabilities (can't write reports).
- Laptop computers are not available for detectives.

More detailed examples of the deficiencies in the area of application of technology are given in the discussions of individual units throughout the report.

An additional problem was the fact that no area of the department was formally designated as the division or unit tasked with overall departmental responsibility for technology. This was recently addressed with the release of a new General Order issued in November of last year. G.O. 01-09 establishes the current Information Services Division as being the area responsibility for coordination of technology issues. However, it is not clear if the department is in compliance with this General Order.

RECOMMENDATION 1-4

A major first step toward effective use of technology should be the development of a departmentwide Strategic Plan for Technology. This plan should include the following:

- an inventory of the department's current computers;
- an evaluation of their suitability for continued use (by individual computer);
- recommendations for upgrades and replacements of each machine;
- identification of current technology needs by division;
- short-term prioritization of needs by division;

- recommendations for applications of technology where effectiveness or efficiency can be enhanced;
- recommendations for how the department can stay current with technology;
- identification of costs and cost/benefit analysis for future recommended expenditures; and
- ensurance of departmental compliance with General Order 01-09.

The proposed Strategic Deployment and Information and Technology divisions can facilitate this Strategic Plan for Technology, but it should be supplemented by outside professional support. This is an area that all major organizations are having to address, and considerable state-of-the-art knowledge can be obtained from technology consultants who are familiar with local government and law enforcement needs.

IMPLEMENTATION PLAN

1. Information and Technology and Strategic Deployment should draft a recommended approach for the creation of a Strategic Plan for Technology. The approach should include an internal needs assessment and the use of external technology professionals.
2. A technology-consulting firm should be retained to support the development of the plan.
3. An internal needs assessment and detailed computer and technology inventory should be conducted.
4. Draft recommendations should be developed in conjunction with the outside consultants and Strategic Deployment and Information and Technology.
5. Draft should be reviewed with Metro Information Services and with MNPD senior staff.
6. Formal Technology Strategic Plan should be adopted.

FISCAL IMPACT

The external consulting support needed to develop a comprehensive Strategic Plan for Technology should be in the range of \$100,000. This amount can be increased or reduced depending on the amount of work in this area the Metro Information Services function has already carried out, and depending on how much information MNPD has on current capacity of systems and equipment and current needs.

FINDING 1-5

The department faces many challenges with regard to the effective use of technology. Not all employees have ready access to automated functions (or computers in general). Shared workstations with many employees using a single computer are the norm. MNPd has many automated functions that are significant enhancement over manual systems, but access to these functions is limited. Many areas have employees sharing computers. Given the tremendous benefit that can be derived from use of these functions, and the necessity to use some of them, it is critical that all employees who rely on computers have access to computers. As an example of the needs in this area, there are some Detectives who are now working three to a computer and work station. This obviously greatly limits productivity.

Computers have not been replaced at a fast enough pace. This has resulted in many machines not being able to run all needed software programs. The pace of replacement of computers has not been adequate. More and more elaborate software and operating systems demand more from computers. As new programs are installed, many older systems may not be able to utilize these programs effectively because they are not sufficiently modern to run such applications.

While the practical life cycle of computers in government service can be longer than it might be in some private sector applications, the fact remains that decisions have to be made concerning Metrowide operating system standards. These standards will be driven by what is available and what can be supported. For example, MNPd cannot continue to use Microsoft 95 when all new machines are being shipped with XP operating systems. Some machines just do word processing or spreadsheet programs. These machines can stay in service as long as the operating system can be supported. However, machines doing more "data intensive" things will not last as long.

The laptops used by officers in the field have very limited capabilities. The units have no report writing and no floppy drives. There are legitimate concerns over the introduction of viruses into the computers if floppy drives are available; however, the absence of this feature seriously limits the practical application of the machines. While the current Patrol laptops allow for some "silent dispatch" capability and allow searching for warrants and mugshots, they do not provide report writing capability. Most departments that place laptops in patrol cars begin with report writing applications because this use is the most labor saving activity that can be done with a portable computer.

Report writing from the car will not be practical without a floppy drive unless radio modems are provided to each vehicle. When reports are written they must be taken off the laptop's hard drive and submitted. Without a floppy drive and without a radio modem to allow the transmission of the report back to HQ, the entire laptop will have to be removed from the patrol car and carried to the station to download to another computer. This is a slow process and will take significant time from the field, the very thing you are trying to overcome with the use of laptops.

RECOMMENDATION 1-5

An inventory of all computers that need to be replaced should be identified. A replacement priority should be established, and all machines should be replaced according to actual need. There is a tendency to provide high-level positions with new

equipment. However, there is often no relationship between the need for a newer and faster computer and supervisory responsibility. In fact, it is often the people in line operations positions that can benefit the most from enhanced computer capacity. The Information Services staff need to be supported in replacing computers where they are needed most, not according to level of responsibility.

Computers currently in use that may be more powerful than needed for routine office tasks (simple word processing and e-mail) should be swapped out for applications where more processing capability and/or memory is needed. Simple RAM memory and hard drive upgrades should be carried out as needed for machines that cannot be immediately replaced.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. A detailed review of all current computers and their intended uses needs to occur.
2. Needs should be prioritized and funding recommendations based on this priority.

FISCAL IMPACT

We estimate that \$250,000 needs to be budgeted for laptops and upgrades at this time. The Strategic Plan for Technology will result in additional spending recommendations.

FINDING 1-6

The current organizational design, with a single Deputy Chief, does not lend itself to effective organizational control, decentralization, or equitable supervisory responsibility. The current Uniform Services Bureau makes up more than half of the department's personnel, and contains virtually all of the 24-hour-a-day emergency operations of the department. The other half of the department's personnel is split into two areas of much more manageable size.

We have seen many examples of significant variance in the responsibility assigned to the supervisory ranks. While individual units will vary in size and complexity of function within a general range, the department does not consistently assign comparable scopes of responsibility to Sergeants, Lieutenants, and Captains.

Further, the current organizational model does not adequately support the objectives of Community Oriented Policing and increased field effectiveness.

RECOMMENDATION 1-6

The department's various functional units should be better organized with regard to scope of responsibility, complexity of tasks, and number of personnel. Attached at the end of the chapter as Exhibit 1-3, is a copy of the department's current organizational chart. Also attached, as Exhibit 1-4, is our recommended organizational chart. Exhibit 1-4 reflects the changes we believe are necessary to refocus the energy of the department on Patrol operations, strategic planning, and management of

resources and to move the department more clearly toward a decentralized Community Policing orientation.

The reallocations of personnel will not all occur immediately. Several issues will need to be addressed, including:

- development of performance measures to assess effectiveness of reassignments;
- consideration of training requirements associated with reallocation of personnel;
- working with Metro Human Resources, determining how to phase in staff reassignments; and
- identification of suitable workspace for reassignments to Sector Stations.

Among the changes recommended are:

Office of the Chief

- Create the Strategic Deployment Division (incorporates Planning and Research and Fiscal Affairs)
- Expand the scope of the Information Services Division to include Technology so this Division then becomes the Information and Technology Division. Transfer this division to the Administrative Services Area.
- Transfer the Criminal Intelligence Division to the proposed Support Services Area.

Uniform Services Bureau

- Assign all Traffic Division personnel to the Sector Stations. Ensure that all understand that the function is not disappearing.
- Assign all School Services Division personnel to the Sector Stations (according to location of current school assignments). Ensure that all understand that the function is not disappearing.
- Remove Crime Analysis function from Planning and Research and combine with CAP directly under the Bureau Commander.
- Place focus on Sector Commands by reallocating officers from other areas.
- Split County into East and West Commands, each under an Assistant Chief to allow for greater attention to the large patrol areas present in Nashville-Davidson County, each of which is larger than

many major cities. (Note the splitting of the Patrol function into two or more geographic areas under different Assistant or Deputy Chiefs is a common practice in larger agencies.)

- As an interim step, one of the proposed Assistant Chiefs in the Operations area should be utilized to command the Patrol area. The other should be utilized to command all Patrol Support functions (e.g., Traffic, School Services, Tactical Investigations). This will allow for an orderly transition until many of the logistical issues associated with the decentralization of personnel can be accomplished.

Investigative Services Bureau

- Five Property Crimes Investigators reassigned to Sector Stations.

Note: a single Detective in this area of assignment (and those listed below) will not be expected to handle all sector crime of this type. This Detective would monitor major crime activity, be a sector resource for central detectives, and handle some of the “breaking” cases. This Detective would have to be supported by other staff. When off duty, the sector could reassign an officer to fill in, or central Detectives would have to be called in. The principal value of this position would be to give the Sector a Detective that can be assigned on critical cases according to the priority of the Sector Commander.

- Five Persons Crimes Investigators reassigned to Sector Stations.
- Five Youth Services Investigators reassigned to Sector Stations.
- Evidence Storage Division transferred to the Administrative Services Bureau.
- Vehicle Impound Division transferred to the Administrative Services Bureau.
- Vice Division transferred to the Support Services Area under the Major in Charge of Special Investigations.
- Elevate Warrants to Division Status.

Administrative Services Bureau

- Shift Planning and Research Division to Office of Strategic Deployment
- Absorb Vehicle Impound Division into the Evidence Collection Division

- Assign the Safety Division as a unit of the Personnel Division. Also assign Recruitment, now in Training, to the Personnel Division.

All of these changes are reflected in Exhibit 1-4. Many of these shifts will require detailed planning to determine space, location, and staffing issues.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Adopt new organizational structure.
2. Determine which officers/employees can be immediately transferred.
3. Develop plans for replacement of officers and employees that cannot be immediately transferred.
4. Create a time line for future transfers.

FISCAL IMPACT

None. This involves reassignment of exiting functions and personnel.

FINDING 1-7

In several cases, one-to-one reporting relationships exist between the Division Commander and the second in command. There are also cases where appropriate spans of control do not exist.

It is generally poor organizational design to create one-to-one reporting relationships. Such relationships tend to undercut either the authority of the supervisor or the subordinate. Weak supervisors can easily “dump” all responsibility on the subordinate. Weak subordinates can easily avoid any direct responsibility, deferring all decisions to the supervisor.

If an area is so large or so complex that the unit head cannot effectively manage all unit supervisors, it is better to split the area into two parts instead of just adding a single additional supervisor in a one-to-one relationship. Two supervisors, each having a part of the overall responsibility, can manage a complex area more effectively than one supervisor. This structure also better establishes the unit head’s role as “high level issues” instead of just being at the top of the unit’s chain of command.

We have also observed supervisory assignments where the level of rank was higher than required by the complexity of the function or the number of subordinate supervisors. For example, a Captain is not required in an assignment where the next rank of supervisor is Sergeant. In such a case, a Lieutenant’s rank is all that is required.

RECOMMENDATION 1-7

One-to-one reporting relationships, where no unique assigned duties are identified, should be eliminated, and unbalanced commands should be addressed. Multiple senior level supervisors are appropriate in areas in which there are a large

number of complex tasks, a great number of staff doing a variety of things, or where critical functions need some additional high level monitoring. When these conditions do not exist, additional layers of supervision are not appropriate.

As part of the strategic planning process, a detailed review of all supervisory assignments should be conducted to ensure that all supervisory layers are necessary, balanced, and aid the operation of the respective functions. It would be appropriate to use a work group of midlevel supervisory personnel to conduct this review in conjunction with Strategic Deployment staff.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Review all supervisory relationships.
2. Recommend additions or deletions of supervisory positions.
3. Evaluate recommendations by Chief and Command Staff.
4. Determine supervisory staffing levels.

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation should be fiscally neutral at worst. At best, some supervisory positions may be identified for elimination or reassignment, and overtime reduction may result in cost savings.

FINDING 1-8

The Patrol Sector Station Commanders have few resources available to them.

While the Patrol Sector Commanders have defined geographic responsibility with regard to Patrol call response issues, they have little ability to actually impact crime in their areas of responsibility. Due to the very centralized operating style of the department, with a significant number of “specialized units,” the Sector Stations in reality have little available to them other than the assigned Patrol Officers. They can certainly ask for additional assistance from the specialized units, but such assistance cannot be depended upon to support regular patrol officers on an ongoing basis.

Beyond the Flex Units (directed patrol/problem solving units), which each Sector has, no other personnel within the Sector commander’s authority can be shifted to address emerging issues or immediate concerns. Investigative follow-up, Traffic Support, Canines, and support from the School Services Division all are essential services that have to be requested on an as-needed basis, and may or may not be provided in the quantity desired.

Numerous opportunities are available for the department to reallocate sworn personnel who are not performing jobs requiring arrest powers. In many areas of the department, sworn officers are doing jobs that can easily be done, usually at lower cost, by civilian employees. Some examples of these jobs are some of the administrative personnel at the Sector Stations, the Field Identification personnel, the officers assigned to the Fleet Operation, officers assigned to the Vehicle Impound lot, and others. Many positions

filled by existing sworn officers could be returned to enforcement roles if replaced by civilian employees.

This topic is presented here only as an introduction. More detailed discussion of this subject is made in Chapter 3.0, as well as the presentation of numerous recommendations designed to accomplish enhancing the effectiveness of the Sector commands.

RECOMMENDATION 1-8

Undertake a departmentwide staffing study of all sworn and non-sworn personnel.

Part of the Strategic Planning Process should be specifically directed toward the review of the staffing requirements and utilization of all units in the department. Part of this review should focus on the potential identification of specific officers in non-Patrol areas that can be reallocated to Patrol duties, along with a plan for their eventual reassignment. In almost all areas of the department sworn officers are performing functions that could be done by non-sworn personnel. Part of the review of such jobs should focus on the necessity for the position, whether or not the function can be combined with another job, and whether or not similar work is already being performed elsewhere in the organization.

Most sworn personnel that can be freed up from administrative and staff positions should be returned to enforcement duties. Some of these reallocations will require that training be provided the replacement employees, and some can occur only if non-sworn personnel can also be reallocated to assume some of these tasks. Non-sworn employees in all areas of assignment should also be evaluated for need and effectiveness of utilization.

Other important areas of this review should be job process identification and review, process re-engineering efforts, appropriate uses of sworn and non-sworn personnel, and the impact of technology on staffing requirements.

Due to the need to conduct this overall staffing review, throughout this report few staffing recommendations are made. In a limited number of cases where specific needs have been clearly identified, some recommendations are made. However, in most cases it is recommended that staffing needs be determined as part of the overall staffing study.

It is likely this staffing review will identify process improvements that may reduce the need for staff in some areas. If this is the case, those officers or non-sworn employees may be reassigned. Until it is determined how many, if any, such reassignments may occur, it will not be known if additional staff will have to be hired to meet staffing needs in specific areas.

In Chapter 3.0 there is more discussion of this topic, as well as estimates of officers that may be available for reassignment.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Identify all sworn officers assigned to non-Patrol assignments.
2. Determine which positions could be carried out by non-sworn personnel.
3. Determine which positions could be deleted through changes in process or through expansion of duties of other jobs.
4. Present recommendations to the Chief and Command staff concerning positions that could be reassigned.

FISCAL IMPACT

The formal review process necessary for a comprehensive evaluation of utilization of both sworn and non-sworn staff will require external support. It is estimated such an evaluation would result in a fiscal impact of \$150,000.

FINDING 1-9

No career development program exists. Officers and supervisors may stay 20 years or more in a single specialized area. In any complex undertaking there is a balance between the need to ensure that individuals with the experience needed to do a task well are kept in assignments for stability and competence, and the need to ensure that others have opportunities to grow professionally, and that critical experience is not limited to just a few employees.

Although an officer may need to have experience in many areas to function well, there is seldom justification for persons being retained in single areas of assignment for over 20 years (a circumstance we encountered in several areas). Such extreme tenure in an area limits the opportunity for professional growth for other officers, and when that person does leave the assignment there is a huge learning curve for anyone stepping in as a replacement. Technical areas do require experience, but many positions also lend themselves to rotation, with some “exempt” slots provided for those exceptional performers who continue to add value year after year.

It is also a harsh reality that many long-term assignments carry extra risk in terms of exposure of the officers to corrupting influences. The routine transfer of Vice and Narcotics officers in particular has long been professionally recognized as an important strategy for preventing the opportunity for individual or systematic corruption to exist. We should emphasize that we found no evidence of any improprieties during this review within any police unit. Instead, our observation is mentioned as an accepted preventive measure.

A related issue is the department’s utilization of Police Officer III positions. Created to provide an opportunity for career growth for nonsupervisory sworn personnel, this position currently serves no clear purpose beyond providing a pay supplement for those officers selected. The PO IIIs do not perform any duties not performed by other officers. Field Training Officers are usually the ones called upon to act as supervisors in the absence of Sergeants, so the PO III position is not used even as a fill-in supervisor.

Another problem associated with the PO III position is that the number of the positions are limited by budget. Not all officers that would be eligible can be selected due to a limited number of budgeted positions.

RECOMMENDATION 1-9

A functioning career development program should be developed. Time limits for the majority of positions in nonpatrol assignments should be adopted and enforced to give officers the opportunity to experience other areas of assignment. As an example, if a specialized area had 10 positions, it might be appropriate for four of these to be “exempt” from rotation, and the other six positions to rotate after three years. Generally, most jobs can be learned in six months, and then the incumbent can function at a satisfactory level. Three to five years in most specialized areas would be a reasonable length of assignment.

Another major part of a successful career development program is the institution of clear training requirements to ensure that persons coming into a specialized area get the training needed to become competent. Otherwise, the rotation of persons through a specialized area will result in a reduction in performance of the entire unit.

Without question there is value in experience and in knowledge of organizational history. This wisdom can be provided in large part by those exempt officers who do not rotate, and by the unit supervisors. However, it would still be recommended that some limitation of time in an assignment be established— maybe six to eight years.

The career development program should also review the PO III position. It should either be modified to serve some specific departmental purpose, or be eliminated. In many departments Senior Police Officer or Master Police Officer positions are established. These positions, in addition to requiring a certain length of service, typically require the officers to acquire specific skills and credentials to qualify. These special skills provide added value to the department. These positions are often used as relief supervisors as well.

Any officer meeting these requirements is then appointed and retains that position unless the qualifications are lost. Such qualifications as being Field Training Officers, and radar or breathalyzer certified, are often included in the requirements for these positions.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Develop a new career development program as part of the revision of General Orders. Evaluate the current PO III program.
2. Develop and review draft policy with all division commanders and police officer advisory group.
3. Provide input and recommendations back to General Orders Committee.

4. Present proposed policy to the Chief and Command Staff.
Return for revision as necessary.
5. Adopt and implement formal policy.

FISCAL IMPACT

There will be no fiscal impact to this recommendation.

FINDING 1-10

The current promotional process does not adequately provide for determination of supervisory/managerial aptitude, nor does it take into account past performance.

The current promotional process for positions below the rank of Captain involves both a written examination and an assessment center (a practical exercise is administered to the candidates) and requires the selection of persons from the resulting list in direct rank order. The process does not allow disqualification for poor performance or disciplinary history. Nor can the Chief pick from the top three as is the process with the Metro Fire Department; he has to pick from the top position on the list.

A major flaw with this process is the reality that there is no direct correlation between an excellent test taker and an excellent supervisor. Knowing what to do as demonstrated by an exam, and being willing and able to do it in real life, are two very different things. While specific knowledge is important for prospective supervisors, many other factors are also important to consider.

It is a clearly established fact that the best predictor of future performance is past performance. Persons who do not perform well, who lack motivation, have bad attitudes or disciplinary problems, exercise poor judgement, have attendance problems or other sub-par behavior seldom become model employees.

If promoted, these problem employees become problem supervisors and misdirect an entire group of employees who are exposed to their example. At the present time, the Chief cannot prevent anyone exhibiting poor performance from being selected as a supervisor. If such an individual tests at the top of the group, performance notwithstanding, they have to be selected as a supervisor.

Not only is such a practice harmful to the best interests of the organization, it may subject the government to the potential for litigation. Negligent assignment and negligent supervision lawsuits are becoming very common against units of local government. If a supervisor who is "known" to be unsuited for duty as a supervisor is selected and utilized as a supervisor, and a harm results, the government can face direct liability as the result of it being reasonable to expect such an outcome.

It was interesting to note that nonranking police officers and supervisors alike were very critical of the current promotional system. There is a consensus that many officers who would make superior supervisors are being screened out by the current process. Additionally, the current process does not enable the department to factor diversity goals into promotional practices.

During the last two promotional cycles for Lieutenant (1998 and 2000) there were very few minority or female candidates in the top 30 positions. In 1998, two white females, one black female, and one black male were in the top 30. In 2000, only two white females and one hispanic female were in the top 30.

In the most recent Sergeant's exams (also 1998 and 2000), the results were very similar. In 1998 there were five white females and one hispanic female in the top 30. In 2000, there were four white females in the top 30. These results make it clear that it will be very unlikely that representative numbers of women or minorities will be promoted in the near future.

RECOMMENDATION 1-10

The promotional process should be restructured to incorporate identification of supervisory and managerial aptitude and should place a significant emphasis on the past performance of promotional candidates, rather than relying solely on promotional examination scores. In addition to required knowledge as demonstrated in a written exam, other factors should be considered. Past performance, training and preparation for further responsibility, a proven ability to exercise good judgement, a disciplinary history free from problems that will hinder effectiveness as a supervisor and leader, and overall attitude are all very reasonable factors to evaluate when making promotional decisions. A new process should be developed, in conjunction with the Civil Service Commission and the Fraternal Order of Police, that will recognize qualities and traits likely to result in good supervisors.

The Metro Fire Department has adopted a "rule of three" procedure whereby a selection may be made from the top three candidates instead of automatically having to select the top candidate. This process, while far from a total solution, at least provides for more flexibility when attempting to select candidates with the best qualifications and aptitude for supervisory responsibility and to provide greater opportunities for women and minority candidates.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Creation of Promotional Process Committee, involving identified stakeholders.
2. Identification of concerns of all involved parties with existing process and any consideration of a different process.
3. Conduct peer review of comparable agencies to determine type of promotional processes used.
4. Develop recommendations for a new promotional process.
5. Present to the Chief and the Command Staff for review.
6. Adoption of a new process (after going through whatever process for formal adoption may be required to obtain approval of involved parties).

FISCAL IMPACT

This recommendation will not have a fiscal impact.

FINDING 1-11

The Intelligence function is being carried out by at least four different areas of the department (Criminal Intelligence, Vice, Criminal Investigation Division, Patrol), and maybe others. The Intelligence function is currently very fragmented. While there is a dedicated HQ unit, other operational areas also gather intelligence information. Although much information is gathered, we could not determine how effectively the various sources of intelligence are integrated or how effectively this intelligence, when analyzed, is disseminated.

RECOMMENDATION 1-11

Carry out a core process analysis of the Intelligence function. The analysis should determine where intelligence is gathered, how it is transmitted, how it is analyzed, and how it is disseminated. While intelligence needs to be gathered in a variety of locations, collection and analysis should be centralized for maximum effectiveness. The various organizational units involved in this process should complement each other, not duplicate services.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Appoint an Intelligence Review Committee made up of current staff involved in this function and users of criminal intelligence information.
2. Review current processes for selection, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence information.
3. Develop model for intelligence function that will serve departmentwide needs.
4. Present proposed process model and staffing requirements to Chief and Command Staff.
5. Adopt new process model and implementation.

FISCAL IMPACT

There will be no fiscal impact to this recommendation. Existing resources and personnel will be reallocated according to outcome of the review of this process.

FINDING 1-12

The Crime Analysis function is not centralized. Parts of the crime analysis function are carried out by Traffic, Patrol, Planning, and CID. The various operational units in the department all carry out activity that resembles Crime Analysis. The current Crime Analysis in Patrol unit (CAP) operates only five days a week, not

providing information on Saturday or Sunday. The functions of this unit are also limited to reporting of crime activity, rather than analysis.

While a lot of information must be monitored in an agency this size, there is still significant value in attempting to consolidate the Crime Analysis function. The current practice leaves too much to chance in terms of information collection and dissemination.

MNPD is currently reviewing some aspects of this process.

RECOMMENDATION 1-12

Conduct a core process analysis of the Crime Analysis function. Complementary activity is acceptable; duplication of effort and the resulting duplication of resources are not. A specific recommendation is that the Planning and Research based Crime Analysis function be transferred to the Uniform Services Bureau and be combined with the CAP (Crime Analysis – Patrol) Unit. This function can be performed effectively by non-sworn personnel.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Appoint a Crime Analysis Review Committee made up of current staff involved in this function and users of crime analysis information.
2. Review current processes for selection, analysis, and dissemination of crime analysis information.
3. Develop centralized model for integrated crime analysis function that will serve departmentwide needs.
4. Present proposed process model and staffing requirements to Chief and Command Staff.
5. Adopt new process model and implementation.

FISCAL IMPACT

There will be no fiscal impact to this recommendation. Existing resources and personnel will be reallocated according to the outcome of the review of this process.

FINDING 1-13

The take-home car program has not been fully implemented. Many patrol officers are not assigned cars. Our review of the recently completed Fleet Study shows MNPD has 716 marked Patrol Cars available. With 392 officers (supervisors and Flex Unit members are not included in this number) involved in the most recent bid for Patrol assignment, an ample number of marked units should be available for officers who are actually assigned to field duty. This apparent disparity in the number of cars thought to be available and the actual number available indicates that reallocation of marked units is possible.

It has also been determined that at least 10 civilian employees are currently assigned take-home cars. Some of these may be necessary, but it is unlikely that all these assignments are essential. It should also be noted that officers who live outside Davidson County are not eligible to be assigned a take-home car.

RECOMMENDATION 1-13

MNPD should review the assignment of all of MNPD's marked and unmarked vehicles. Priority should be given to Patrol Division personnel actually assigned to field patrol. Any marked units assigned to officers not working in Patrol should be subject to immediate reassignment to Patrol. The review should also include review of all unmarked vehicles, both those in pool assignments and those assigned to individuals.

Prior to any consideration of buying additional vehicles, this vehicle utilization review should be conducted. It should be a goal of the review to reallocate vehicles to Patrol and to other enforcement units. The use of "vehicle allowances" and/or paying mileage for use of personal vehicles should also be considered for non-sworn personnel, after considering any liability issues.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Appoint a Vehicle Allocation Committee comprised of supervisors from various units of the department.
2. Identify all departmental vehicles and review their current assignments. Look at types of vehicles by assignment for suitability and utility.
3. Establish an assignment priority process for all classes of vehicles.
4. Present to the Chief and Command Staff recommendations on allocation of existing vehicles and recommendations for any vehicles that should be requested in future year budgets.
5. Reallocate existing vehicles as needed adopt uniform standards for vehicle assignment in the future.

FISCAL IMPACT

The review process may not have a fiscal impact. Some savings could result by identifying some number of vehicles in low-priority assignments that could be shifted to other assignments. Paying mileage for non-sworn employees subject to call-out should also be less expensive than the continued provision of a take-home vehicle. The review process may, however, result in capital spending recommendations for additional vehicles.

FINDING 1-14

The intake and booking process is cumbersome and delays prisoner intake. The booking process involves many steps and relies on the cooperation of the Sheriff's staff

for smooth prisoner processing. Staffing of the Sheriff's Office is periodically a problem, as is the mandated use of the CJIS automated booking forms. CJIS problems are reported to be common causes of booking delays. The program is evidently unstable, often "crashing," which brings booking to a standstill. Data input errors are also frequent, either as "user error" or due to the lack of training given to users. In either case, errors have to be corrected at some point during the booking process and can often add to delays.

The department was recently able to obtain authorization to use paper booking documents whenever CJIS is down for 30 minutes or more. In the past, lengthy delays have resulted while officers were required to wait for the CJIS system to be brought back on line so booking could resume. By being able to use paper forms when CJIS is down for extended periods, some of the former delays will be avoided.

The current practice of having a single Commissioner (magistrate on duty) perform all intake on arrested persons is an unnecessary bottleneck. This single judicial official cannot practically handle the volume of arrested persons during peak periods without creating a significant delay. As no relief Commissioner is available during meal breaks or other times the Commissioner is otherwise not available, there can be extended periods when no intake occurs and officers are delayed returning to their regular duty assignments.

Any unusual volume of arrested persons, such as a group arrest, will totally overwhelm the intake process.

The Sheriff's Office currently does some limited remote booking at the South Sector Station. Persons arrested on misdemeanor citations may be booked at the South Side Sector and released pending trial. During the hours of operation of this program, this avoids the need to transport and book at the main jail those persons arrested on many minor charges.

RECOMMENDATION 1-14

Conduct a core process analysis and re-engineering study on all aspects of the booking process. It is our opinion that opportunities for improvement in this process exist. There are potential bottlenecks both at intake (due to the single intake judge) and at booking, due to the speed of the process and the level of staffing provided to the jail. Additionally, a second magistrate should be added for heavy arrest times. In order to realize any significant value from additional magistrate positions, it would be necessary to add at least three of them. There are currently five magistrates providing coverage 24 hours a day seven days a week. Two additional magistrates would allow for additional coverage 16 hours a day. A third additional magistrate would provide sufficient relief coverage to allow for vacation and other relief, and could be scheduled for additional peak period overlap when all magistrates were available for duty.

IMPLEMENTATION STEPS

1. Establish a work group of staff from the Office of the Mayor, the District Attorney, Sheriff, MNPd, and the Chief Administrative Judge to review the issue of judicial staffing of the intake function and the current intake function in total.
2. Conduct a review of other major judicial circuits in Tennessee to determine how the Nashville process compares to others.
3. Prepare recommendations for improvements in the intake process.
4. Present recommendations to the Mayor and the other officials on what improvements should be made.
5. Other action, as may result from the adoption of recommendations.

FISCAL IMPACT

The full fiscal impact of this recommendation cannot be determined at this time. Individual magistrates are paid \$52,000 in minimum salary costs, plus benefits, plus costs associated with creating additional office space. The recommended three magistrates would add an annual cost of at approximately \$200,000. However, this will not be an MNPd expense. Offset against the additional cost would be a reduction in lost time due to officers waiting with prisoners because of the intake backlog.

**EXHIBIT 1-3
CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL CHART**




EXHIBIT 1-4 PROPOSED ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

